000			01833nam a22002537a 4500
003			OSt
005			20230609125827.0
008			230609b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9781107569782 _c(Paperback)
082	0	4	_a333.2 _222 _bOS7G
100	1		_aOstrom, Elinor
245	1	0	_aGoverning the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action _cby Elinor Ostrom
260			_aNew Delhi _bCambridge University Press _c2022
300			_axvi, 280p.
490	1		_aCanto classics
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 245-270) and index.
520			_aThe governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common-pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common-pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common-pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
653			_aCommons
653			_aSocial choice
655		7	_aCase studies. _2fast
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c26329 _d26329