Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action by Elinor Ostrom
Material type:
TextSeries: Publication details: New Delhi Cambridge University Press 2022 Description: xvi, 280pISBN: 9781107569782Subject(s): Commons | Social choiceGenre/Form: Case studies.DDC classification: 333.2 Summary: The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common-pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common-pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common-pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
| Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Books
|
Central University Of Rajasthan | General Text Book | 333.2 OS7G (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 39355 |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 245-270) and index.
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common-pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common-pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common-pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
There are no comments on this title.